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Summary 
This memo identifies the concept 
and practice of foundational justice 
as a response to violent conflict and 
transactional politics in the Horn of Africa, 
based on Conflict Research Programme 
(CRP) research. It argues that international 
peacebuilders and scholars should learn 
from and robustly support legal and civic 
activism during protracted conflicts, 
including efforts to combat everyday 
violations, reform justice practices, and 
challenge impunity for atrocities. It proposes 
a shift of priorities. Firstly, there is a need to 
place concerns about justice consistently 
at the core of peacebuilding programmes 
and related research agendas. Secondly, 
there is a need to connect and reorientate 
approaches based on rule of law and 
transitional justice that typically concentrate 
on institutions at the national level and 
reproduce a state-building logic either 
explicitly or implicitly. Foundational justice 
is concerned with advancing more flexible, 
networked, and negotiated approaches 
driven ‘from below.’ 
Institutional and technocratic approaches 
to justice at the level of the state, generally 
supported by international organisations 
within the frames of transitional justice 
or rule of law programming, are liable to 
be undermined or co-opted in a region 
where: (i) the state is violently contested 
and not only domestic but also regional 
and international actors are implicated 
in conflicts; (ii) networked, patronage 
1  This synthesis of the existing conditions derives from Conflict Research Programme findings and 
other relevant sources. For instance, see John Markakis, Günther Schlee, and John Young’s argument that 
the nation-state does ‘not describe what we see’ in the Horn, and its pursuit has been ‘the root cause of many 
evils.’ The Nation State: A Wrong Model for the Horn of Africa, Edition Open Access, Max Planck Research 
Library for the History and Development of Knowledge Studies 14, p170; p17.
2  See Ibreck, R., 2019, South Sudan’s Injustice System: Law and Activism on the Frontline, London: Zed 
Books. 
3  The concept of civicness is more relevant in these settings than conventional notions of civil society. 
See Kaldor, M. 2019, The Phenomenon of Civicness and Researching its Advancement, 22 May, https://blogs.
lse.ac.uk/crp/2019/05/22/kaldor-civicness/. External demands, political pressure and the threat of violence 
makes it exceptionally challenging to effect change, but political transformation has historically been driven by 
non-violent action from below in this region. See de Waal, A. and Ibreck, R., 2013. Hybrid social movements in 
Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 31(2), pp.303-324.
politics and violent ‘political marketplace’ 
logics prevail over institutional and 
bureaucratic politics; (iii) statutory law has 
colonial/imperial origins and has proven 
a serviceable instrument of bargaining, 
violence, and repression; (iv) plural legal 
authorities, forums and laws apply, since 
custom and religion constitute powerful 
sources of legitimacy; and (v) there is a 
wide gap between law on paper and law 
in practice.1 In this context, we argue that 
justice should be pursued and measured at 
the level of social practices and relations, 
and deeply informed by local expertise. 
The concept of foundational justice derives 
from observations of activist practices in 
conflict-affected settings that merit greater 
reinforcement and solidarity.2 It refers to 
the cumulative power of legal and civic 
initiatives, strategic litigation, and efforts 
to harness the law to combat injustices, 
pursued in any judicial or political forum, 
at a local, national, or international level in 
war-torn and ‘fragile’ states. Sporadic and 
vernacular justice practices and struggles 
are always there to be found but tend to 
be underestimated because policymakers 
and scholars lean towards overarching 
critiques, formal institutionalized solutions, 
and external expertise. They may be 
missed when they are driven by ad hoc 
assemblages of lawyers, journalists, 
teachers, or representatives of ethnic 
communities, rather than more visible NGO-
based civil society or social movements.3 
They may also be undermined when 
international actors intervene in plural and 
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inconsistent ways in conflict settings,4 cling 
to unimplementable models and ideals,5 and 
concentrate efforts and funds predominantly 
on formalised peace processes.  
The first step to supporting foundational 
justice is to acknowledge the importance 
of local agency and non-violent justice 
claims. External scepticism compounds 
marginalisation, especially when support 
and attention is concentrated elsewhere.6 
International interveners and analysts are 
trapped within peacebuilding frames that 
direct resources and attention towards 
violent actors – they not only fail to attend to 
and foster civil politics, but sometimes even 
reduce its currency.7 External actors take 
notice when movements emerge to create 
unstoppable pressure for regime change, 
as they did in Sudan in 2019, but they 
4  For instance, by selling arms to repressive regimes and training their militaries: Holden, P. et al, 
2017. Indefensible: seven myths that sustain the global arms trade. London: Zed Books. And by violating 
international humanitarian law: Amnesty International, 2019. USA/Somalia: Shroud of secrecy around civilian 
deaths masks possible war crimes, 20 March, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/03/usa-soma-
lia-shroud-of-secrecy-around-civilian-deaths-masks-possible-war-crimes/. 
5  See Pospisil, J., 2019. Peace in political unsettlement: Beyond solving conflict. Cham, Switzerland: 
Palgrave Macmillan. As Pospisil observes, peace processes never actually conform to the liberal ideal; se-
quencing is in any case a ‘messy interplay... dictated by opportunity,’ commonly providing a ‘formalised 
political unsettlement.’ (pp.8-9). Nevertheless, non-specific references to the need for inclusion and account-
ability in a peace agreement are useful – they may not be implementable within the formal mechanisms of the 
agreement, but they can serve as policy hooks for pragmatic and progressive action at some unspecified point 
in the future by actors, such as civil society, that may not be specified in the document.
6  An observation on journalistic response to the coronavirus pandemic holds true more broadly; exter-
nal accounts of crisis in Africa: ‘understate the agency of affected communities and overstate the contribution 
of foreign interventions.’ Nyabola, N. Africa Is Not Waiting to Be Saved From the Coronavirus, https://www.
thenation.com/article/world/coronavirus-colonialism-africa/.
7  See Srinivasan, S. 2021, When Peace Kills Politics International Intervention and Unending Wars in 
the Sudans, London: Hurst & Company.
8  Sudan’s non-violent revolution in 2018 had deep roots. See for instance De Waal, A., 2013. Sudan’s 
elusive democratization: civic mobilization, provincial rebellion and chameleon dictatorships. Journal of Con-
temporary African Studies, 31(2), pp.213-234.
9  Women and young people who drove the revolution need solidarity. See Abbas, R. 2021, ‘Democra-
cy Means Building and Connecting People as well as Institutions: Lessons from Sudan,’ 12 March, African 
Arguments https://africanarguments.org/2021/03/democracy-means-building-and-connecting-peo-
ple-as-well-as-institutions-lessons-from-sudan/. 
10  For instance, in South Sudan, the European Union and the British Council have supported some 
grassroots justice work, as have several NGOs including PACT, Justice Africa, and Nonviolent Peaceforce, see 
Ibreck 2019.
11  We use this term to refer to the countries that are members of the Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD). Notably, violence has escalated in Ethiopia; the war and atrocities in Tigray especial-
ly constitute a major humanitarian crisis and a wider threat to the region. See for instance, Brown, W. 2021, 
‘Massacres, rapes and starvation: Breaking through the blackout to expose Tigray’s ‘crimes against human-
ity’,’ The Telegraph, 15 May, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/six-months-of-
ethiopias-shadow-war/.  
overlook precedents8 and do not do enough 
to support civic agency in the aftermath.9 
International organisations have supported 
some relevant and productive activities;10 
but they need to give justice much greater 
priority, acting continuously with respect for 
struggles at the margins. 
The Horn of Africa is at a critical juncture: 
reports of human rights violations, electoral 
violence, and mass atrocities have escalated 
in some countries11 and persisted in others 
as political and military leaders continue 
to frustrate peace processes and political 
transitions. In recent years, people have 
mobilised and protested non-violently, 
pursuing justice claims in a multiplicity of 
forums, innovating in the realm of non-
violent politics under harsh conditions. At the 
same time, governments in the region have 
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become ever more adept at surveilling and 
suppressing civil society and protesters.12 
Worryingly, international aid budgets which 
had provided some opportunities for civil 
society are now shrinking and risk being 
further diverted towards security sector and 
military spending.13 At the same time, threats 
to peace and welfare are persistent and 
escalating,14 providing stark evidence that 
security sector reform programmes typically 
fail. In this context, the possibilities for peace 
depend largely upon valuing and fostering 
non-violent struggles for justice.
The argument for foundational justice is 
underpinned by ‘systems-thinking.’15 The 
aim is to tip the balance towards non-
violent politics in a highly complex and 
volatile political context. It proposes that 
international and regional policymakers step 
back from linear, institutional, and top-down 
approaches to justice interventions, and 
instead invest in ‘ecosystems for justice.’16 
This means putting material and political 
resources into public goods including 
education and legal empowerment tools 
(such as paralegalism) to enhance the 
social capital, negotiating the power of civic 
activists and citizens. It means providing 
safe spaces and resources for interactions 
and networking by plural legal and judicial 
actors at local, national, and regional levels. 
12  See for instance, Human Rights Council, Detailed findings of the Commission on Human Rights in 
South Sudan, A/HRC/46/CRP.2,18 February 2021. Human Rights Watch, Uganda: End Enforced Disappearanc-
es of Opponents: Investigate Abuses; Release Those in Arbitrary Detention, 11 March, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2021/03/11/uganda-end-enforced-disappearances-opponents.    
13  For instance, there have long been tensions between international commitments to human rights and 
the security priorities of ‘migration governance’ and counter-terror in the region. Lutz Oette, Mohamed Abdel-
salam Babiker, Migration Control à la Khartoum: EU External Engagement and Human Rights Protection in the 
Horn of Africa, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 36, Issue 4, December 2017, pp. 64–89. There are risks as-
sociated with new financial structures that will allow the EU to fund African military operations directly, instead 
of through the African Union, see International Crisis Group, How to Spend It: New EU Funding for African 
Peace and Security, 14 January 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/african-union-regional-bodies/297-
how-spend-it-new-eu-funding-african-peace-and-security. 
14  Climate change and the Covid pandemic are also exacerbating the ‘intertwined crises’, Council of the 
European Union, 2021, The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU, 10 May, pp.2-3.  https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/49533/st08135-en21.pdf.  
15  See Pospisil (2019. pp.42-43) for relevant insights on complexity. 
16  We thank Iavor Rangelov for this concept. 
17  For an account of this theory of change applied in a different context, see: Termeer, C. J. A. M., & 
Metze, T. A. P. (2019). More than peanuts: Transformation towards a circular economy through a small-wins 
governance framework. Journal of Cleaner Production, 240, 118272.
18  Detzner, S. 2019, Security Sector Reform in Sudan and South Sudan: Incubating Progress, Conflict 
It also entails developing strategies to 
consolidate existing justice efforts. Among 
other things, international peacebuilders 
should encourage and value ‘small 
wins’ by legal and civic actors in conflict 
settings – documenting and publicising 
achievements and good precedents; helping 
to connect and amplify their activities and 
achievements.17 In the short term, this 
approach may make micro-contributions 
to elements of welfare, accountability, and 
rights for individuals and groups. In the 
long term, it promises to contribute to the 
socialisation of progressive norms and their 
translation into practice, catalysing legal and 
political transformation.
Our five key recommendations are: 
1. Support civil society to engage 
with and press for transparent, 
accountable, and human rights-
responsive justice and security 
institutions: The success of any 
reforms in the justice and security 
sectors depends upon civilian 
knowledge, pressure, accountability, 
and oversight, along with coalitions 
for change that link civil society, 
civilian politicians, and reform-
minded members of the security18 or 
justice institutions themselves. Local 
7          Foundational Justice:  A Strategy for Peace in the Horn of Africa
actors such as community paralegals 
and representatives of women’s 
groups especially merit support – 
they have the cultural knowledge, 
legitimacy, and patience to develop 
and drive agendas for normative 
change. International actors can 
foster ecosystems for justice by 
providing economic and educational 
resources and creating spaces for 
local and regional networking and 
knowledge-exchange.
2. Focus on justice practices: 
State-focused and institutional 
approaches will not suffice in a 
region where plural authorities 
govern and where customary and 
religious laws mechanisms are 
widely used and legitimate. Plural 
judicial actors, including judges, 
chiefs, and Sharia judges, must 
be consulted and engaged with in 
dialogues about reforms to legal 
practices. Rather than ‘capacity-
building’ or top-down legal reforms, 
such interactions should be directed 
towards information-sharing, 
building connections, and negotiating 
changes in practice. Women and 
young people have the most to gain 
from normative and legal changes, 
given that they are subject to 
inequality and discrimination, so it 
is especially important to include 
them and reinforce their negotiating 
power in justice reform dialogues and 
processes. 
3. Document and publicize claims for 
justice: This can be done in various 
forums, including local, national, 
regional, and international courts. 
Monitoring courts is a means not only 
to identify good precedents but also 
encourage them. Media campaigns 
and community-based education can 
Research Programme Memo, 10 December, https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Conflict-Re-
search-Programme/crp-memos/SSR-Sudans-Incubating-Progress-final.pdf. 
19  On the African Union, see: Odinkalu, C.A. (2015) International Criminal Justice, Peace and Reconcilia-
tion in Africa: Re-imagining an Agenda Beyond the ICC. Africa Development, 40(2), pp.257-290.
help spread awareness. It is essential 
to learn from justice claims, even 
when they fail. 
4. Consistently uphold the principle 
of accountability for atrocity 
crimes and human rights violations 
across the region: Mechanisms 
and timings must remain flexible. 
Justice for atrocity crimes does not 
need to be linked to a successful 
political transition. The demand for 
an end to impunity for political elites 
asserts an important principle, even 
if the immediate goals of obtaining 
justice outcomes are frustrated. 
Leaving justice off the agenda in 
selective cases (as both regional 
and international organisations 
have done in Somalia) undermines 
human rights norms and principles 
that have evolved and acquired 
legitimacy at the continental level.19 
Support for timely investigations 
and documentation by human rights 
activists, and local and international 
lawyers is essential to lay the 
groundwork for future justice claims.
5. Adjust evaluations of justice 
programmes: Micro-level or singular 
actions by legal professionals or 
community-based activists are 
challenging to support and ‘scale-
up.’ Their results cannot be captured 
with short-term measures of impact, 
since norms, relations, and practices 
change slowly over long periods of 
time. Funders must also anticipate 
that political elites will resist justice 
claims and reforms. Participatory 
methodologies for researching and 
building the evidence base for justice 
interventions – that are sensitive to 
context and more realistic in terms of 
timeframes for positive results – will 
be needed. 
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Defining Foundational Justice
The concept of foundational justice is 
derived from the study of courts, legal 
practices, and civic struggles in conflict-
affected countries in the Horn of Africa. It 
offers a distinctive analysis of the relations 
between law and conflict and argues for 
new approaches to policy formulation 
and measurement.20 Foundational justice 
encapsulates three core insights:
1. Law is part of the problem of conflict 
and repression in the Horn of Africa. 
Laws and legal instruments are 
deployed as tools of power and 
control by political and military elites. 
Material reward, threats of violence, 
and patronage or kinship networks 
(the trifecta of cash, coercion, and 
connections) generally trump the 
impartial functioning of laws and 
regulations. Discrimination against 
women and young people is rife. 
Counteracting the instrumental and 
repressive use of law is therefore 
essential to conflict transformation. 
2. Justice claims and efforts by legal 
and civic activists to promote and 
protect vulnerable people, reform 
dysfunctions in the justice system, 
and end impunity for political elites 
constitute principled challenges to 
the transactional basis of political 
power, even when they fail. 
20  It builds on and relates to previous Conflict Research Programme work on concepts of civicness and 
theories of change in the political marketplace, see:  de Waal, A., Sarkar, A., Detzner, S. and Spatz, B. A Theory 




21  A ‘norm institution’ is a pattern of behaviour or custom, such as in the ‘the institution of marriage’ as 
opposed to a ‘formal institution’ organisation administering some aspect of public affairs. 
22  Rangelov, I. and Teitel, R., 2014. Transitional Justice. In Kaldor, M. and Rangelov, I. (eds) The Hand-
book of Global Security Policy, UK: John Wiley & Sons, pp.338-352.
23  See McAuliffe, P., 2013. Transitional Justice and Rule of Law Reconstruction: A Contentious Relation-
ship. London: Routledge. As McAuliffe argues, the gap between the rule of law and transitional justice debates 
and programmes needs to be bridged: ‘transitional justice has not paid the requisite attention to the institu-
tions, culture and norms that need to be fostered in a justice system in transition.’ However, we diverge from 
McAuliffe on the argument that the reconstruction of the state justice sector is ‘foundational’ (p.288). Rather, 
we emphasise the strengthening civic agency aimed at forging or reinforcing accountability relations between 
people and the plural public authorities that govern in conflict settings in the Horn. 
3. Progress towards justice (and peace) 
rests upon cultivating shared norm-
institutions21  and strengthening 
civil networks and movements to 
counteract militarism and monetised 
patronage. Legal empowerment 
strategies and plural initiatives 
to claim justice by civil means in 
courts, dialogues, and agreements 
will contribute to setting precedents, 
harmonizing law, and embedding 
justice in practice.
The concept of foundational justice builds 
upon previous formulations of the ‘justice 
dilemma’ after atrocities.22 It is related to the 
dominant framework of transitional justice 
in that it describes efforts to invigorate 
justice endeavours in response to systemic 
or gross human rights violations and atrocity 
crimes. Like transitional justice, it embraces 
judicial and non-judicial measures, including 
prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations, 
reform, and memorialisation. Similarly, the 
concept is linked to rule of law interventions 
in that it is concerned with improvements 
in the justice system and the socialisation 
of human rights norms.23 However, the 
concept diverges from both these existing 
international policy frameworks in that it 
questions their assumptions about the 
primacy of institutions and nation-states 
and the prospects of linear pathways 
towards liberal democracy. 
Transitional justice has its roots in state 
actors in countries transitioning from 
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dictatorships to democracies, and from 
more recent applications promoted by 
international actors and civil societies in 
countries still at war, or in the ‘grey zone’ 
between conflict and peace, repressive and 
democratic rule.’24 The model of transitional 
justice has increasingly become normative 
and prescriptive – conventionally offering a 
toolkit of time-bound internationally-funded 
institutional responses to an anticipated 
political transition or ‘distant’ and lengthy 
proceedings in international courts.25 In 
contrast, foundational justice is descriptive, 
based upon identifying and valuing existent 
and emergent practices in conflict settings. 
It is concerned with supporting the societal 
norms and agendas for justice in turbulent 
contexts and regions in which the state is 
fragmented and institutionalised governance 
has yet to emerge. It describes timely, 
practical, and negotiated responses on the 
ground. It is informed by our research in 
conflict settings but also by wider evidence 
that legal empowerment programmes 
work.26
Foundational justice is also related to 
concepts of ‘transformative justice’ which 
are usefully minimal and process-focused, 
namely: ‘Transitional justice is about 
unleashing transformative dynamics, not 
about creating transformation all by itself.’27 
Transformative justice recognises some 
of the limits on transitional justice and 
proposes more holistic and comprehensive 
mechanisms founded in socio-economic 
realities, which could address the roots 
of conflict. It encompasses different 
paradigms: peacebuilding (making it 
emancipatory, not top-down), reconciliation 
(making it a more all-embracing set 
of processes), and restorative justice 
(incorporating social and economic rights, 
24  Nassar S. and Rangelov, I., 2020, Documentation of Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice 
in Syria: Gaps and Ways to Address Them, Conflict Research Programme, LSE.
25  This despite the fact that it was originally coined to describe processes underway in states undergo-
ing democratic transitions.
26  For instance, see Maru, V. and Gauri, V. eds., 2018. Community Paralegals and the Pursuit of Justice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
27  Gready, P. and Robins, S., 2014. From transitional to transformative justice: A new agenda for prac-
tice. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8(3), pp.339-361, p. 355.
28  African Union, 2019, Transitional Justice Policy, December, pp.4-5. https://au.int/sites/default/files/
documents/36541-doc-au_tj_policy_eng_web.pdf. 
and the human-rights based approach to 
development; making compensation and 
restitution into sustainable/emancipatory 
development). Indeed, some transitional 
justice policies have already incorporated 
many of these insights, notably the African 
Union Transitional Justice Policy (2019) 
which insists on attention to ‘the particular 
context and cultural nuances of affected 
societies, as well as the gender, generational, 
ethnocultural, socio-economic and 
development dimensions of both peace and 
justice.’28
Yet, while agendas for change must be 
holistic and grounded at the local level, 
they must also be feasible and resonate 
at a higher political level, nationally and 
internationally. Where there is no effective 
political transition – only a persistently 
dysfunctional and turbulent political system 
– we cannot expect to find systematic 
efforts to engage with the structural origins 
of conflict and/or the political economy 
sustaining conflict. In contrast, foundational 
justice refers to both tangible and observed 
justice claims and (occasional) justice gains 
that have arisen despite the exceptionally 
harsh conflict circumstances. It also 
encompasses those that stretch across 
the multiplicity of transnational actors 
implicated in violence and governance in 
conflict settings in the Horn of Africa. It 
values diffuse, organic, and sporadic justice 
claims at multiple levels. Its prescription 
is not for international actors to design 
these instrumentally, but to foster enabling 
environments, value achievements when 
they arise; and link them conceptually and 
practically. It does not forgo the principle 
that those ‘most responsible’ for atrocities 
should be held criminally accountable, 
but it does not predetermine the timing or 
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forum, nor does it link justice to a political 
transition. Instead, it anticipates that as 
and when demands for prosecutions are 
asserted by affected people they should be 
robustly supported, and that the struggle 
to bring political elites to account is itself 
meaningful in forging accountability 
relations and building constituencies for 
justice.   
Finally, both transitional (and transformative) 
justice and the wider array of interventions 
under the heading of ‘rule of law’ tend 
to operate under an either explicit or 
implicit methodological nationalism. 
They suppose a centralised statebuilding 
logic, and nascent or eventual functional 
institutions – despite the fact that what 
we might call ‘actually existing’ transitional 
justice policies and mechanisms are being 
implemented in contexts characterised by 
ongoing disorder, violent conflict, and legal 
pluralism.29 When war is a social condition, 
and violence and lawfare are routine tools 
of governance, we should not envisage 
trade-offs between peace and justice in a 
peace deal, since without interventions to 
halt the authoritarian and arbitrary use of 
legal instruments there can be no peace. 
It is also problematic to reify the state. In 
these systems, various political authorities 
command legitimacy, power is in constant 
29  Legal and judicial pluralism is a characteristic of the region; in most countries justice is delivered by 
‘informal’, customary institutions. See DefendDefenders, 2019. On the Legal Frontline: Lawyers and Paralegals 
and Human Rights Defenders in the East and Horn of Africa, https://defenddefenders.org/on-the-legal-front-
line-lawyers-and-paralegals-as-human-rights-defenders-in-the-east-and-horn-of-africa/. This applies even 
in the most developed countries in the region. In Ethiopia ‘village elders are the most frequently used third 
party for resolving disputes.’ HiiL, 2020, Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Ethiopia: Legal problems in daily life. 
https://www.hiil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/JNS_Ethiopa_2020-1.pdf. 
30  This point is informed by the extensive literature analysing governance in conflict settings including 
work on ‘political marketplaces’: de Waal, A., 2015. The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the 
Business of Power, Cambridge: Polity Press; ‘negotiated states’ Hagmann, T. and Péclard, D., 2010. Negoti-
ating statehood: dynamics of power and domination in Africa. Development and Change, 41(4), pp.539-562; 
‘hybrid political orders’ Boege, V., Brown, M.A. and Clements, K.P., 2009. Hybrid political orders, not fragile 
states. Peace Review, 21(1), pp.13-21 and ‘global liberal governance’ Duffield, M., 2002. Social reconstruc-
tion and the radicalization of development: aid as a relation of global liberal governance. Development and 
change, 33(5), pp. 1049-1071.
31  Schouten, P., 2021. Violence and fragmentation in Congo’s political marketplace. Conflict Research 
Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, pp. 34-35. 
32  See: de Waal, A., 2020. ‘No End State: Exploring vocabularies of political disorder,’ Somerville MA, 
World Peace Foundation, Occasional Paper no. 26, October.
33  Interpreting justice in particular situations, incorporating participation and dialogue with the affected 
people and prioritising social relations over rules is included in many local ‘customary’ ‘restorative’ traditions. 
negotiation, the state is fragmented, and 
networks matter more than institutions. 
Political marketplace politics plays out 
at subnational and regional levels, and 
therefore so too might more legitimate and 
accountable political complexes.30 
Constraining violence and securing rights 
and justice in contexts of fragmentation and 
fragility requires acting beyond the state. 
It requires negotiation and networking; for 
instance, political entrepreneurs engaged 
in violence may also share or cultivate 
interests in counteracting certain excesses 
of violence;31 and institutions implicated 
in violence may also host some people 
of integrity. Foundational justice does not 
make normative judgements about which 
political actors or forums might initiate 
or yield progress towards justice. Rather, 
foundational justice is concerned with 
promoting ‘norm-institutions’32 and therefore 
diverges from statist assumptions about 
the political order, its jurisdictions, laws, 
actors, and institutions, leaving open the 
possibilities for regionalised or localised 
legal and governance arrangements, 
and acknowledging the salience of local 
customary and religious mechanisms. It 
is defined by practical efforts to address 
injustices in context and restore and 
promote just relationships.33
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Foundational justice is a pragmatic, situated 
approach attuned to addressing the 
multifaceted persistent ‘wicked’ problem 
of systemic injustices for which top-down 
linear policymaking and implementation 
processes are ill-suited.34 It places expedient 
actions by legal and civic activists in conflict 
settings or the diaspora at the centre, 
envisaging problem-solving approaches and 
plural agile responses to specific injustices 
rather than prescribing all-encompassing 
programmes.35 It recognises the duality 
of law as both a hegemonic force and a 
potential tool of emancipation36 by those 
using non-violent methods to seek restraints 
on arbitrary power, gender equality, land 
rights, and a host of other human rights in 
conflict settings.37 It starts with and learns 
from what is possible and practical on the 
ground, cultivating norms and practices at 
the societal level as well as through courts, 
and valuing local expertise.38 It refers to 
demands for and advances towards justice 
across the spectrum of civil and political 
as well as social and economic rights, 
including to respond to gravest violations of 
rights, sexual and gender-based violence, 
and atrocity crimes in conflict settings. 
It is also envisaged in feminist relational theory of justice which emphasises goals of ‘meaningful account-
ability’ and ‘just relationships.’ Llewellyn, J.J., 2012. Integrating peace, justice and development in a relational 
approach to peacebuilding. Ethics and Social Welfare, 6(3), pp.290-302.
34  A wicked problem is defined by incomplete and contradictory knowledge; by the relevance of many 
people and opinions to solving it; by economic challenges; by cultural complexities; and by its interconnected-
ness with other problems. See: https://www.wickedproblems.com/1_wicked_problems.php. See also: Termeer, 
C. J. A. M., & Metze, T. A. P., 2019. op.cit.
35  Indeed, there is previous support for the value of problem-solving approaches in this sector. For 
instance, an evaluation of Department for International Development (DfID) security and justice programmes 
called for a ‘focus on finding solutions to specific problems, rather than achieving across the-board improve-
ments in S&J institutions,’ (p.15) and also identifies the strengths of national NGOs and paralegals as partners 
in community justice while raising questions about programmes to ‘build capacity that might be misused’ for 
instance by focusing on police reform (p.22). Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Review of UK Devel-
opment Assistance for Security and Justice, Report 42 – March 2015. Also note substantial relevant literature 
on rule of law which also evaluate the impacts of coalition-building, although typically state-centric in as-
sumptions and focus. See for instance: Desai, D. and Woolcock, M., 2012. The Politics of Rule of Law Systems 
in Developmental States: ‘Political Settlements’ as a Basis for Promoting Effective Justice Institutions for 
Marginalized Groups. Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper No. 08, July. 
36  This duality is frequently highlighted by socio-legal theorists, even in the most challenging cases. See 
for instance: Erakat, N., 2019. Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine, Stanford, California: Stan-
ford University Press. As Leebaw puts it: ‘While law can be a tool for regulating violence and exposing abuses 
of power, law is also utilized to obfuscate and legitimate abuses of power.’ Leebaw, B., 2008. The irreconcilable 
goals of transitional justice. Human Rights Quarterly, 30(1), 95-118, p.97.
37  The regional human rights framework underpins our analysis and would guide identification and eval-
uation, including the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Maputo Protocol.
38  This contrasts with international approaches which have ‘objectified Africa... in an enterprise in which 
it ought to have significant agency,’ as Odinkalu (2015, p.260) observes.
We anticipate its utility in identifying and 
fostering justice practices – considered 
broadly – that can tangibly improve 
protection and redress in the most difficult 
places.
‘Lawfare’, systemic injustice, and the 
limits of peacebuilding
Legal and judicial institutions constitute 
an essential service that is foundational 
to any social and political order; they 
entail commitments to forms of civic 
authority, non-violence, and peaceful 
dispute resolution. Despite this, in the 
Horn of Africa they are also routinely used 
as instruments of repression, and they 
foment grievances. Countries in this region 
have records of impunity dating back at 
a minimum to the colonial (or in the case 
of Ethiopia, imperial) period. Their justice 
mechanisms come in multiple forms, 
including all sorts of statutory, customary, 
and religious courts, and many of these 
have often been manifestly dysfunctional 
and implicated in direct or indirect forms of 
12          Foundational Justice:  A Strategy for Peace in the Horn of Africa
violence. Moreover, political entrepreneurs 
have become adept in the ‘game of the 
rules,’39 exploiting their knowledge of 
multiple concepts of rights, law, and justice, 
and using them strategically to either 
fuel divisive identity politics or repress 
societies, resulting in legal manoeuvres 
and dysfunctions that vary not only 
between countries but also within them. 
International interventions in this complex 
terrain generally lean towards strengthening 
state institutions, but are otherwise 
highly inconsistent, as the following brief 
illustrations suggest.
An extreme case of law being used as an 
instrument of control and repression is the 
Ethiopian government’s ‘law enforcement 
operation’ in Tigray, characterised by 
indiscriminate shelling that hits schools, 
hospitals, and markets in urban areas 
and other mass violence targeted against 
civilians. Ethiopian authorities insisted they 
were not fighting a war but suppressing an 
illegal organisation, described as a ‘junta’ 
and proscribed as terrorists,40 invoking law 
as a justification for combatting political 
opposition and cover for starvation crimes.41 
In response, the United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has focused its efforts at the level of the 
state, promising a joint investigation with 
39  De Herdt, T. & Olivier de Sardan J.P. (eds), 2015. Real Governance and Practical Norms in Sub-
Saharan Africa: The Game of the Rules. London: Routledge.
40  Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Unlawful Shelling of Tigray Urban Areas, February 2021, https://www.
hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas. 
41  See: World Peace Foundation, Starving Tigray: How Armed Conflict and Mass Atrocities Have De-
stroyed an Ethiopian Region’s Economy and Food System and Are Threatening Famine, April 2021. 
42  See United Nations Human Rights Council, Joint Press Statement, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HR-
Bodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26949&LangID=E. 
43  See for instance: Reuters Investigates, 2021, River of Blood: How ethnic killings exploded from an 
Ethiopian Town, 7 June, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions/. 
Note for instance the activism of African women calling for the establishment of a female peacekeeping force 
https://www.sdgsforall.net/index.php/goal-5/1551-african-women-stress-the-need-for-a-horn-of-africa-
peace-initiative. 
44  Majid, N. and Abdirahman, K., 2021. The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubbaland, Conflict 
Research Programme Research Memo, 26 March, p.1 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/109317/2/The_kismayo_bub-
ble_updated.pdf. 
45  Felbab-Brown, V., 2018. The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, So-
malia Case Study, May, UNU-CPR Centre for Policy Research. p. 9.
46  Ibid, p.15.
the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 
towards a ‘credible accountability process.’42 
This bureaucratic approach is not viewed as 
credible within Tigray and is likely to meet 
with opposition, and valuable evidence and 
testimony risks being lost. In the meantime, 
it has been left mainly to international 
journalists and human rights organisations 
to gather evidence on atrocities with little 
attention so far to the actual or potential 
contributions of regionalised and localised 
civic coalitions for justice.43 
In Somalia, the institutions of formal 
justice have proven to be deeply corrupt. 
In most places, ‘government courts 
remain subject to high levels of corruption 
and manipulation, are slow, limited by 
poor security and a lack of enforcement 
capacity.’44 Nevertheless, regional and 
international policymakers have backed 
the Somali government and collaborated 
in efforts to militarily crush its opponents, 
notably Al-Shabaab. They have generally 
framed the conflict through a counter-terror 
lens, paying little heed to demands for 
justice.45 Indeed, the Somali government has 
offered amnesties to Al-Shabaab defectors, 
despite protests from civil society.46 In 
contrast, Al-Shabaab has leveraged the 
corruption and injustices among political 
elites linked to the state to mobilise support. 
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It has built forms of order and legitimacy 
around functional Sharia courts – such that 
while the legal code that they implement 
is often regressive and punishments may 
be harsh, they have proven to be a ‘credible 
actor in the provision of justice’47 are valued 
for their ‘swift, effective, and, crucially, non-
corrupt and fair rulings.’48 
In South Sudan, statutory law has 
predominantly consisted of control 
mechanisms used by those in power. The 
police, the judiciary, and national security 
entities have been deeply entangled with 
conflict and help to explain its persistence 
– although these actors are neglected in 
peace negotiations and agreements.49 At 
the everyday level, customary courts have 
played vital roles in dispute mediation and 
addressing some forms of criminality at 
local levels (see below). However, they 
function mainly to regulate societies since 
they cannot generally hold political elites 
accountable for violence or abuses of the 
law, and they also perpetuate ethnic and 
gender differences and inequalities. In 
this case, international organisations have 
amassed evidence of violations of probable 
war crimes and crimes against humanity 
and exposed an ‘entrenched culture of 
impunity’ at the root of the conflict.50 
International actors have supported 
transitional justice agendas, yet they 
have simultaneously pursued rule of law 
programmes along separate trajectories, 
at the risk of strengthening state security 
instruments in violent kleptocracies.  
47  Majid and Abdirahman, 2021. p.1. 
48  Felbab-Brown, 2018. pp.7-8.
49  See Ibreck 2019, chapter two. See also: Nantulya, C. K. 202, Will South Sudan Rein in its Notorious 
National Security Service: The NSS has become a feared agency and a vital tool in the government’s campaign 
of silencing dissent, Human Rights Watch, 6 May, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/06/will-south-su-
dan-rein-its-notorious-national-security-service.
50  The African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AU CoI), Final Report, Addis Ababa, 15 
October 2014, https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.final.report.pdf, pp.210-220.
51  See Macdonald, A., 2019. ‘Somehow This Whole Process Became So Artificial’: Exploring the Transi-
tional Justice Implementation Gap in Uganda. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 13(2), pp.225-248.
52  Note that a dynamic Kenyan civil society were effective in getting justice on the agenda, but discon-
nected from the grassroots, the case demonstrated the limits of ‘reliance on international norms’, Hansen, T.O. 
and Sriram, C.L., 2015. Fighting for justice (and survival): Kenyan civil society accountability strategies and 
their enemies. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 9(3), pp.407-427, p.427.
Across the Horn of Africa, international 
policymakers have already made some 
productive investments, for instance in 
community-justice programmes and human 
rights documentation. But these are typically 
under-resourced and counteracted by the 
enduring emphasis on formal institutional 
justice procedures that risk reproducing 
the problems of law as control. In some 
countries they have given their backing 
to transitional justice agendas. But while 
steps to bring to account political leaders 
responsible for atrocities in Sudan, Ethiopia, 
and South Sudan under the rubric of 
transitional justice processes are to be 
welcomed, experience suggests that they 
will fail if they are reduced to institutionalised 
and technical processes. The political 
effects of international transitional justice 
policies may be complex and contradictory, 
as powerfully illustrated by selective and 
technocratic transitional justice processes 
in Uganda51 and the backlash against the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in Kenya.52 
The problem is not simply that transitional 
justice is an externally-driven agenda; it is 
also that even when civic actors and victims 
have pushed it forward in conflict settings 
its implementation is invariably top-down. 
Moreover, it is fraught with risks and delays 
as its proponents are up against strong 
political resistance, often from states that 
have themselves been strengthened by 
international support. 
In general, institutions for law and security 
are essential for citizens to realise their 
rights and be protected, but they can 
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also be harnessed for political violence. 
International donors that engage in 
programming in this area should bear both 
elements in mind. Institutional support 
to security services and formal justice 
structures is easy to programme and its 
outputs are straightforward to measure. 
But such assistance can be used in support 
of authoritarian agendas. Support to 
grassroots efforts to hold these institutions 
accountable, on the contrary, is more difficult 
to programme and its results may be hard to 
measure, especially over short time periods. 
Nevertheless, creative ways must be found 
to support emergent struggles and justice 
practices.
‘Law from below’: Justice claims in 
conflict settings
CRP research over the past five years shows 
that legal and civic activists, many legal 
and judicial authorities, and even some 
government officials are striving to make 
justice systems work and have innovated and 
set precedents in conflict-affected settings.53 
Their strivings occasionally produce ‘small 
wins’ (usually imperfect and impermanent) 
at local, national, and regional levels. We 
conclude that these various practices of 
non-violent justice, rights, and accountability-
seeking are entry points for transforming 
violent conflict,54 as the following examples 
help to illustrate.
53  This is based on observations of courts in Somalia and South Sudan but also on wider evidence, for 
instance HiiL (2020, p. 6-7) reports that 40% of Ethiopians face legal problems and 80% of them take some form 
of legal action. South Sudan Law Society which undertook a survey of 1,525 individuals in 11 locations between 
October 2014 and April 2015 and found strong support for criminal accountability and prosecutions, Deng, D.K, 
Lopez, B., Pritchard, M. and Ng. L.C, 2015. Search for a New Beginning: Perceptions of Truth, Justice, Reconcili-
ation and Healing in South Sudan, June, South Sudan Law Society https://www.undp.org/content/dam/south-
sudan/library/Rule%20of%20Law/Perception%20Survey%20Report%20Transitional%20Justice%20Reconcilia-
tion%20and%20Healing%20-.pdf. 
54  At issue in South Sudan for instance, is the need to challenge not only impunity but the problem of ‘the 
culture of revenge or private retribution’ in Akech, J.G., 2020. Rethinking Transitional Justice in South Sudan: 
Critical Perspectives on Justice and Reconciliation. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 14(3), pp.585-
595, p.589. Nevertheless, we note that ordinary people have also sought and demanded justice for all manner of 
crimes; they face repeated disappointments and long odds against success in individual cases but have often 
respected decisions even when they go against them.
55  See Majid and Abdirahman, 2021, p.8
In the case of Somalia, Majid and Abdirahman 
identify a ‘bubble’ of functional, legitimate 
courts in Kismayo established in 2018. 
Based on hundreds of court observations 
and interviews, they established that cases 
were progressing efficiently and at a low cost 
in the hands of locally-respected judges. 
The revived district courts coordinated well 
with an elders committee and local sheikhs 
practicing Islamic law, bringing a coherence 
to the provision of justice. Notably, people 
from various clan backgrounds were able to 
access the courts and expressed satisfaction 
with their processes and decisions. The 
authors attributed these developments 
partly to increased intelligence and security 
capacity under President Ahmad Madoobe 
of Jubbaland, with his first-hand knowledge 
of the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Shabaab 
courts, and one of his associates who 
influenced the justice reforms. It turned 
out that providing credible everyday justice 
mechanisms required judges who are 
‘impartial, competent and committed’, 
whose knowledge of the local context and 
reputation mattered more than their legal 
expertise. While the courts did not conform 
to international human rights standards, they 
were important contributions to everyday 
justice and deterrent against criminality and 
the threat of Al-Shabaab in a highly unstable 
context.55 Yet, the gains were clearly fragile 
and only made visible through monitoring 
and documentation. 
In the Somali region of Ethiopia, Hagmann 
identifies long-term struggles for justice 
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at the sub-national level, within Somali 
region.56 It was the arrest by the federal 
state of former president Abdi ‘Iley’ and the 
appointment of the new regional president, 
that opened the way for transitional justice 
agendas in 2018. Yet, the aspirations and 
efforts for justice also rested upon the work 
of local groups to document violations 
and press for accountability. Among these, 
the Ogaden Human Rights Committee 
(OHRC) built up an archive of reports of 
thousands of extra-judicial killings, rapes, 
and forced disappearances between 
1995 and mid-2007. Former prisoners 
in the notorious Jigjiga Central Prison 
spoke out about torture and lobbied for 
justice compensation and rehabilitation.57 
Additionally, a lawyer (and presidential 
advisor) was pursuing an initiative to 
create a truth, justice, and reconciliation 
commission within the regional government 
administration. 
As Hagmann argues, peace in Ethiopia’s 
Somali region is contingent both on 
efforts to address the legacies of mass 
violence and on legal and judicial reforms 
to establish an independent judiciary and 
accountable public authorities. But priorities 
and decisions about the mechanisms, 
timings, and processes must be determined 
within the region. The existing customary 
Somali conflict resolution mechanisms, 
xeer (‘contract’ between clan units) and 
blood compensation, should be engaged 
in these processes, but they are not in 
56  Hagmann, T., 2020. Fast politics, slow justice: Ethiopia’s Somali region two years after Abdi Iley, 
Conflict Research Programme, Briefing Paper, 11 September. Criminal charges brought against former presi-
dent of Somali region Abdi ‘Iley’ and 46 individuals in 2019 for massacres in 2018 had not progressed. 
57  The new president had a ‘personal stake in holding the police accountable’ (ibid, p.2) and this, 
combined with the pressure from local and international human rights organisations, led to the closure of 
the prison and the prosecutions of a former prison head. Audrey Kawire Wabwire and Felix Horne, 2019. 
Interview: Inside what was Ethiopia’s Jail Ogaden, 10 July, Human Rights Watch https://www.hrw.org/
news/2019/07/10/interview-inside-what-was-ethiopias-jail-ogaden. 
58  There is evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, unlawful detentions and killings, 
torture, rape, displacement, communal conflicts, and even ongoing environmental destruction, and the range 
of perpetrators therefore include commanders in the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, and federal security 
and intelligence officers, regional officials, local actors, and even international corporations, among others. 
Hagmann, 2020, pp. 1-2.
59  Ibid. This concern is only reinforced by increasing instability and violence in Ethiopia since. See for 
instance, Al Jazeera, Over 100 killed in clashes in Ethiopia’s Afar, Somali regions, 4 July 2021, https://www.
aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/7/dozens-killed-in-clashes-in-ethiopias-afar-somali-regions. 
60  Hagmann, 2020, p. 9.
61  See Ibreck, 2019. 
themselves sufficient to deal with the 
range of violations or perpetrators.58 In 
this context, there is a ‘dire need to put in 
place safeguards against the repetition 
of abuses of civilians’ but there is no 
federal framework for accountability and 
little imminent prospect for a ‘meaningful 
transitional justice process.’59 However, 
there are multiple initiatives towards justice 
taking place within the region or at local 
levels that demand support.60 
In the case of South Sudan, we identify 
a wealth of evidence that civic and legal 
activists have responded to violence and 
discrimination in courts in real time during 
the conflict, with limited resources. Some 
have taken on cases of abuses of power, 
land grabbing, cattle raiding, rape (including 
in rare instances by government officials, 
militaries, or the police), corruption, or 
domestic violence. Some have contributed 
to forms of humanitarian action, working to 
identify and negotiate the release of people 
who have been arbitrarily detained. Others 
have tried to work within the institutions 
of justice to make them function in the 
face of repression by the government or 
sought to effect change in statutory laws 
or in customary systems that discriminate 
against women and young men. In some 
cases, they have been successful, winning 
prosecutions, setting legal precedents, 
negotiating solutions, or promoting legal 
and practical reforms.61
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In addition, chiefs and their courts play 
important roles in mediating local disputes 
while providing a ‘catch-all social service’ 
responding to all manner of social distress 
and deprivation. On one hand, the courts 
are functional for political elites, they are 
patriarchal, enforce laws that contravene basic 
rights, and reproduce hierarchies of gender 
and age. But on the other, they routinely 
undertake activities that are indispensable 
for social survival and dignity. As Newton 
et al. show, chiefs’ courts have taken on 
the responsibility for encouraging and 
adjudicating claims for food made by poor 
people against their better-off relatives in 
times of hardship. They operate according to 
a general social norm of preventing the poor 
from starving and focus on implementing 
specific obligations from wealthier individuals 
to their poorer kin. These so-called ‘hunger 
courts’ respond to famine conditions by 
insisting on the shared moral imperative at 
community level to provide basic sustenance 
to people, to prevent them from starving.62
South Sudanese activists have also pressed 
for transitional justice mechanisms, 
contributing to the inclusion of a Hybrid Court, 
Commission for Truth Reconciliation and 
Healing and Compensation and Reparation 
62  Newton, C., Mawien, B., Madut, C., Gray E. and Pendle, N., 2021, Chiefs’ courts, hunger, and improving 
humanitarian programming in South Sudan. Conflict Research Programme, London School of Economics and 
Political Science. 
63  A recent blog argues that the South Sudanese people want ‘forgiveness, reconciliation and healing.’ 
Abraham Diing Akoi, 2021, ‘The Hybrid court could be a recipe for further conflict’, Africa at LSE blog; South Su-
dan’s leaders have made similar arguments, see: Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, South Sudan Needs Truth, Not Trials’ 
Opinion, The New York Times, 7 June 2016. Yet there is much evidence illustrating support for criminal account-
ability. See Deng et al. 2015 (op. cit) and the findings of the national dialogue for instance: Republic of South Sudan 
National Dialogue Steering Committee, Sub-committee For Eastern Equatoria, 2018 Grassroots consultations final 
report details for Eastern Equatoria, December, www.ssnationaldialogue.org, p.12.
64  The working group comprises key civil society organisations, transitional justice experts, and members 
of women’s groups and faith-based organisations. Transitional Justice Working Group: Building a Foundation for 
Justice in South Sudan An Agenda for the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) Janu-
ary 2021.
65  McCrone, F. ‘War Crimes and Punishment: The Terrain Compound Attack and Military Accountability in 
South Sudan, 2016-18,’ Small Arms Survey, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Briefing Paper, August 2019. 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/briefing-papers/HSBA-BP-Terrain.pdf 
66  Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2018, Lundin Energy Lawsuit, (re complicity in war crimes in 
Sudan). 18 October. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/lundin-petroleum-lawsuit-re-com-
plicity-war-crimes-sudan/. 
67  Rickard, C. ‘Sacking of 14 judges by South Sudan President unconstitutional: East African Court of Jus-
tice,’ African Lii, 28 July 2020. https://africanlii.org/article/20200728/sacking-14-judges-south-sudan-presi-
dent-unconstitutional%3A-east-african-court. 
Authority in the 2018 peace agreement.63 
While authorities continue to slow-walk the 
institutions, lawyers and civil society groups 
are laying the groundwork for justice. South 
Sudan’s Transitional Justice Working Group 
is working to inform and consult citizens and 
craft agendas towards justice, and calling for 
a ‘nationwide civic engagement process’ to 
inform and engage people in the process.64 
The Terrain Hotel trial set a precedent in 
prosecuting military actors for rape.65 South 
Sudanese lawyers have also brought a 
series of precedent-setting challenges to 
the South Sudanese government in the East 
African Court of Justice.66 Even the actions of 
international actors look set to be tested in the 
courts.67
Claims for justice such as those identified 
in CRP research tend not to be seen as 
significant for peacebuilding by scholars 
and international policymakers. This is 
partly because they take vernacular forms, 
or are episodic and dispersed. But it is also 
because rights-related cases in conflict 
settings rarely succeed – and even when 
they do, the changes they engender are 
gradual, uneven, and fundamentally uncertain. 
Women asserting their rights are silenced or 
repudiated; community land claims against 
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those who have disposed them are dismissed; 
claims against men in uniform rarely prevail.68 
In contrast, a foundational justice framework 
treats it as significant that activists assert 
the norms, even when they do not win their 
cases. The act of making the claim is equally 
important as the existence of an institution in 
which such a claim can be made. 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
This analysis suggests that rather than 
asking how to design justice processes for 
aspirational institutionalised systems, it is 
essential to ask in practical terms how citizens 
and civil society have pursued and achieved 
justice in settings of persistent conflict and 
turbulence, and how their efforts might be 
supported and advanced. Such an approach 
subverts the assumption that delivering justice 
depends principally on building the capacities 
of the state, rather, it suggests that of critical 
importance is building relations between 
citizens and the plural public authorities that 
are actually governing. 
Our theory of foundational justice is as 
follows. In a context where formal institutions 
remain weak or co-opted, and where a 
transition to institutionalised democracy is 
a distant prospect, progress towards justice 
is nonetheless possible, through small wins. 
Consistent justice claims and principled 
struggles to promote ‘law from below’ 
represent normative challenges to the logic of 
the political marketplace, and to the militarised 
and mercenary values, transactional practices, 
gender inequalities and ethnic divisions that 
sustain it.69 Over time, small wins can build up 
networks and constituencies for justice and 
can consolidate norm institutions that promote 
accountability and non-violent political 
practices.70 Many of these small wins are acts 
of resistance: opposing injustices, perhaps 
68  See DefendDefenders 2019, for further examples of both successes and challenges across the region. 
69  See de Waal, A. 2016, Introduction to the Political Marketplace for Policymakers, JSRP Policy Brief 1 March. 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Conflict-Research-Programme/policy-reports/JSRP-Brief-1.pdf.  
70  This closely relates to the concept of ‘civicness’ identified in other CRP research, see Kaldor 2019, op. cit. 
with little success other than symbolically 
affirming a principle. Such actions constitute 
expressions of agency and build normative 
foundations for peace.
It is admittedly difficult to design metrics for 
measuring progress towards foundational 
justice through small wins. Current evaluation 
methods and matrices are designed on the 
supposition of functional formal institutions 
and expect results within the timeline of a 
single project cycle. Foundational justice 
requires greater patience because normative 
change needs longer to achieve outcomes. 
In some cases, it consists in preparing the 
ground for changes that may occur decades 
into the future. Rather than specifying precisely 
what such an evaluation metric would look like, 
we pose this as a challenge for research and 
policy, and in the interim propose a framework 
for research and action.  
A starting point is identifying, connecting, 
publicising, and building upon existing 
initiatives and achievements. Researchers 
should delve into legal pluralism and the 
legitimacy of customary and religious laws 
and norms; but they should also investigate 
efforts to reform and progress justice through 
non-state forums (avoiding trying simply to 
elucidate their rules and treating cultures as 
if they were static). They should attend to 
the innovative ways in which lawyers and 
activists from the Horn of Africa are pursuing 
strategic litigation in a multiplicity of courts, 
local, national, regional, and international. They 
should study local agency and the pragmatic 
and contextual approaches practiced by 
local lawyers, paralegals, women’s groups, to 
identify incremental gains and the challenges 
of pursuing cases, even when there is a 
vanishingly low prospect of winning.
Our generic recommendations to international 
partners are as follows. Development partners 
have acquired considerable experience 
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in justice programming, including both 
conventional support to governmental 
institutions and smaller scale assistance 
to the NGO sector and activists and – 
occasionally – to informal justice institutions 
and legal and civic activists. The latter tend 
to be underestimated. In future, they should 
be treated as pivotal in a theory of change 
for how progressive changes can occur in 
turbulent political systems in which state-
building and democratic transition remain 
elusive. International assistance to state-
focused security and justice institutions 
should include components of support for 
non-state actors, including lawyers and 
paralegals to undertake monitoring and 
engagement. More generally, internationals 
should support legal empowerment, strategic 
litigation, networking of legal professionals 
and activists, and other ‘law from below’ 
activities – materially and politically. This kind 
of justice programming is an inexpensive 
long-term investment in progressive legal 
and normative change. 
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